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Article 12

Shearen: A Tribute to Judge Donald P. Lay

MARY

E.

SHEARENt

For more than twenty-five years, Judge Lay has served the
people of the Eighth Circuit, first as a circuit judge, then chief
judge, and now as a circuit judge with senior status. He has
also given of himself to the legal community in other ways: as
lawyer, law school professor, author, and mentor. I was privileged to have been his student in his seminar, Recent U.S.
Supreme Court Decisions, at William Mitchell College of Law.
My first glimpses of the Judge disclosed to me that he was a
man who knew the law well, attended to it carefully, and most
importantly, believed in it passionately.
Throughout the year in which I was privileged to serve
Judge Lay as a law clerk, I was allowed to see the judge's
human side. The judge always treated his staff as family. He
and his wonderful wife, Miriam, carved time from already toobusy schedules to entertain us on an ongoing basis. He took a
real interest in us and was genuinely concerned about our personal lives. He tried hard to allow us to meet the demands of
our outside lives. One day, I received a call from my day care
provider to tell me that my five-year-old son had become sick.
Judge Lay asked me how fast I could get there, and there was
no question about where I should be.
This is not to say that the judge did not demand hard work
and an excellent product. The judge demanded of us what he
demanded of himself: determination to complete the project, a
willingness to do whatever it took, and intellectual honesty.
Of all the judge's fine qualities, in my mind, there is one
which really sets him apart and which demonstrates the finest
judicial ideals. This quality is his absolute passion about the
law. The judge believes, and the word "believes" is so inadequate to describe how this affects him, that the law really
means something-that it means freedom, justice, order, and
the foundation for civilization. Most important, Judge Lay believes that, in America, the law is for every person. I hope to
t Associate, Best & Flanagan, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Former Law Clerk to
ChiefJudge Lay, 1988-1989. B.A. 1975, College of St. Catherine;J.D. 1988, William
Mitchell College of Law.
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illustrate through the use of three cases heard during my clerkship how the judge's philosophy manifested itself.
Burger v. McGilley Memorial Chapels, Inc.,' was the first case I
worked on during my clerkship. Burger was a fifty-seven-yearold embalmer who had worked for many years for the McGilley
brothers. When the two brothers sold the business to the
"next generation," the new owners decided, for some still-unexplained reason, to force Burger out. Soon after the changeover, the new management told Burger to resign or get fired
and probably never work again in that city. He refused to resign and was fired. Thereafter, the young McGilleys told one
of Burger's prospective employers that they fired Burger because he was working for other mortuaries while on duty at
McGilleys.
Burger sued, claiming that he was illegally fired because of
his age and that the McGilleys had slandered him. A jury
found against him on the age-related claim but found he had
been slandered and awarded him $85,000 in punitive damages.
The trial judge affirmed the jury verdicts of the discharge and
slander but set aside the punitive damages award.
Judge Lay read the entire record, as he does with every case
he decides, and was very troubled. There was considerable evidence supporting Burger's claim of malicious slander. Judge
Lay carefully raked through the facts in the record and traced
the law on actual malice. He concluded that Burger had met
the standards entitling him to punitive damages, so he reinstated the jury's $85,000 punitive award. Judge Lay was very
concerned that the law had not "done right" by Gerald
Burger.
The second case, Estis v. Bowen,2 was a Supplemental Security Income case. Estis was a forty-two-year-old woman with a
tenth grade education. She suffered from severe asthma and,
due to the numerous medications she took, had many side effects, including obesity. She claimed that she was disabled due
in part to the asthma and in part to the side effects of the medications. Her claim was denied.
Under the law, Estis was entitled to appear before an administrative law judge to present evidence to contest the denial of
her benefits. A reading of the record revealed that the ALJ had
1. 856 F.2d 1046 (8th Cir. 1988).
2. No. 88-539 (8th Cir. 1989).
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been flippant, insensitive, offensive, and rude to Ms. Estis.
Judge Lay wrote, "This court finds that the ALJ's insensitive
demeanor and flippant comments at the hearing of this matter
were inappropriate and give the appearance of impropriety
and bias. Estis was not given a fair and impartial hearing as
required by due process." 3 Ms. Estis' case was reversed and
remanded for a new hearing before an impartial judge.
Judge Lay could have stopped there. But, disturbed that the
ALJ's inappropriate behavior had harmed the fairness of the
hearing, the appearance ofjustice and, ultimately, the integrity
of the process, he wrote to Louis Sullivan, Secretary of Health
and Human Services, saying:
When an administrative law judge is demeaning and flippant and fails to offer courtesy to claimants who are ignorant of the law and its procedures, it seems to me that the
integrity of the entire judicial process is challenged.
I hope you will continue to encourage administrative law
judges, who have greater contact with the public than most
judges throughout America, to treat claimants with the utmost courtesy and with the greatest degree of fairness.4
Secretary Sullivan responded that, as a result of Judge Lay's
letter, the particular ALJ had been counseled by his superiors.5
Also as a result, judicial demeanor was added as a topic for the
continuing education programs attended by ALJs. The whole
legal process was strengthened because Judge Lay cared and
because he acted.
The final case is United States v. Spotted War Bonnet.6 In that
case, the defendant, Roy Spotted War Bonnet, had been
charged with sexually abusing his two young daughters. Relying heavily on the testimony of the two girls, who had been
repeatedly questioned using anatomically-correct dolls, Spotted War Bonnet was convicted.
A panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction, but
Judge Lay posted a strong dissent. Although the charges of
sexual abuse of children were disgusting, and everyone shared
3. Id., slip op. at 3.
4. Letter from Donald P. Lay to Louis Sullivan, Secretary of Health & Human
Services (Aug. 8, 1989) (copy on file with the William Mitchell Law Review).
5. Letter from Louis Sullivan to Donald P. Lay (Jan. 24, 1990) (copy on file with
the William Mitchell Law Review).
6. 882 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1989), vacated, 110 S.Ct. 3267 (1990), on remand, 933
F.2d 1471 (8th Cir. 1991).
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a desire to protect the victimized children, Judge Lay scrutinized the record closely to ensure that Spotted War Bonnet
had received a fair trial. He was alarmed at what he found. In
the social worker's and psychologist's zeal to protect the children, they had unknowingly manipulated the children into
coached admissions. Judge Lay wrote:
The protection of young children from sexual abuse is
certainly a worthy goal. The age of the child often makes
these cases difficult to prosecute. However, while the protection of the child is of course an important societal interest, due process of law and the presumption of innocence
cannot be waived for those who are accused in sexual abuse
cases. The Government's proof must be trustworthy and
reliable. The trial court must ensure that the evidence is
competent and not subject to suggestion and manipulation.
Suggestive pretrial interviews, repeated over and over by
experts trained in psychology, cannot rule the day simply
because the defendant has been accused of sexual abuse.
Every defendant no matter how disgusting or heinous the
allegations, deserves a fair trial. The law demands it. 7
Once again, Judge Lay's deep conviction that the process, the
fairness, and the integrity of the law is to be cherished and protected gave him the insight revealed above.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari" and remanded Spotted War Bonnet to the Eighth Circuit to be reconsidered in light
of Idaho v. Wright.9 On remand, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed
Spotted War Bonnet's conviction.' 0 Again Judge Lay dissented." Although certiorari has now been denied,' 2 Judge
Lay's dissent still stands as an admonition to those who would
join in "witch hunts" of those accused of heinous crimes. Testimony of children must be carefully elicited to prevent the "unnecessarily suggestive" quality apparent to Judge Lay in Spotted
War Bonnet.'" Some might think that Judge Lay had a lot of
courage to articulate what might be perceived as an unpopular
position. But I really do not think courage had much to do
with it. The judge believes, in the fabric of his soul, that the
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 1375 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
Spotted War Bonnet v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 3267 (1990).
110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
933 F.2d 1471 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1187 (1992).
Id. at 1475 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
Spotted War Bonnet v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1187 (1992).
Spotted War Bonnet, 933 F.2d at 1478 (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
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process, fairness, and availability of the law to every person is
its strength, its truth, and its essence.
Through these three cases, I have attempted to show the
quality ofJudge Lay which impressed me the most: his burning
love for the law. It has been my great honor and privilege to
serve this man who has served the law so well for so long.
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